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Abstract
In this article, we collect consumer delinquency data from several eco-
nomic shocks in order to study the creation of stress test models. We
leverage the Dual-time Dynamics modeling technique to better isolate
macroeconomic impacts whenever vintage-level performance data is avail-
able. The stress test models follow a framework described here of focusing
on consumer-centric macroeconomic variables so that the models are as
robust as possible when predicting the impacts of future shocks. We con-
sider the Mexican Peso Crisis / Tequila Eﬀect by examining Argentina;
Asian Economic Crisis by considering Thailand, Indonesia, and Singa-
pore; the Hong Kong SARS recession; and the relative lack of recessions
in recent data from Canada and Australia.
Keywords: Dual-time Dynamics, Nonlinear Dynamics, Time Series
Analysis, Portfolio Forecasting, Scenario-based Forecasting, Retail Lend-
ing, Stress Testing, Macroeconomic Scenarios
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1 Introduction
This article is a companion to [3] in that whereas the ﬁrst article lays out the
modeling approach and best practices for creating stress test models using the
Dual-time Dynamics (DtD) approach, this work describes the application of that
to a range of countries and historical economic crises. The motivation behind
this exercise is to show how to make generally applicable models when training
on speciﬁc crises. For example, the Hong Kong SARS Recession was in response
to fears about a deadly disease, and yet the macroeconomic shocks created can
be used as a way to measure more generically how consumers respond to diﬃcult
situations.
At the other extreme, we need to create stress test models in countries where
no oﬃcial recession has occurred within the range of data available at most
ﬁnancial institutions. We need to consider how to leverage the ﬂuctuations in
growth that do occur in order to create a useful stress test model.
1.1 Method of Analysis
In some of the cases considered, only aggregate information is available, such
as the Consumer Slow Debt provided by the Argentine Central Bank and the
Consumer Bankruptcies provided by the Canadian Central Bank. For such data
sets, standard time series modeling techniques can be employed and these cases
emphasize the selection of macroeconomic variables.
In cases where vintage-level performance data is available, we can leverage
the method of Dual-time Dynamics [2] to remove the impacts of the natural
maturing of the portfolio and changes in the marketing plan. DtD studies the
rate of events occurring in aggregate rather than whether individual events such
as default or early repayment occur at an account level. The idea is that the
rate of events r, is a function of the age a of the account, the vintage orgination
date, v, and the calendar time t. Thus segmentation must involve cohorts of
the same vintage even if the portfolio is further segmented on other features.
With DtD, the rate r is represented as a combination of three separate
functions
lnr(a,v,t) = fQ(v) + fm(a) + fg(t) (1)
where fm(a) is the maturation function, fQ(v) captures the quality or inherent
risk of the vintage, and the impact of the calendar time t, fg(t) on the rate is
called the exogeneous curve. DtD recognizes that the exogenous curve involves
both internal operational eﬀects by the lender as well as external economic
eﬀects. So the curve is ﬁrst investigated by experts within the lending organi-
zation to identify eﬀects that were caused by changes in operational policy or
portfolio construction. The exogenous curve is revised to remove these eﬀecs
and only then does one attempt to ﬁt the curve to economic factors.
The following example illustrates the potential value of this approach. The
example is of a US retail portfolio where the product was launched in early
1998. The maturation curve for this product shows that peak delinquency is3
not reached for about two years. Therefore, several years are required for the
portfolio to saturate and reach its long term delinquency level, assuming no
further changes in the marketing plan. Analyzing the vintage-level performance
data with DtD allows us to extract the maturation, exogenous, and vintage qual-
ity curves. In essence the exogenous curve is normalized for portfolio growth,
maturing, and changes in marketing plan, clarifying the impacts of the macroe-
conomic environment.
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The Exogenous Curve
Figure 1: A comparison of the delinquency rate and corresponding exogenous
curve for a portfolio launched in 1998. Note that the delinquency rate obscures
the impacts of the macroeconomic environment.
The DtD method of studying exogenous curves proves to be very useful in
studying economic crises in emerging markets, because the retail portfolios in
those countries are also growing and maturing along with the economy.
1.1.1 Backward Extrapolation
Portfolios frequently have a small block of vintage data available and a longer
historical time series of total portfolio performance. Because most emerging
market portfolios are growing rapidly, the aggregate rates alone would provide
misleading correlations to macroeconomic variables, because of the maturitation
eﬀect. However, the aggregate information can provide a way of solving for what
the exogenous curve would have been to create the observed performance.
To extrapolate the exogenous curve backward, a set of equations is required
that relates the vintage variables being analyzed with DtD to the total portfolio
metrics available. When we analyzed the Thai and Indonesian portfolio data,
the vintage variables were DR(v,t), the ﬂow through n months delinquent, and
AAR(v,t), the active accounts for vintage v at calendar time t. These two rates4
are deﬁned as
AAR(v,t) = AA(v,t)/BA(v) (2)
DR(v,t) = DA(v,t)/AA(v,t − n) (3)
where n is the number of months delinquent, e.g. accounts that are three months
delinquent would be compared to Active Accounts three months prior. BA is
the Booked Accounts at the start of the vintage, and AA is Active Accounts.
We deﬁne t = 0 at the start of the vintage data set, and that data includes
vintage performance data for t > 0 for all vintages including those originated
for v < 0. The goal is to extrapolate the exogenous curves backward for t < 0.
AAR is modeled just with a maturation function. Since a = t − v, this is
expressed as
ln(AAR)0(v,t) = AARm(a) + AAR, (4)
while the default rate is modelled using the full DtD model, namely
ln(DR(v,t))0 = DRm(a) + DRg(t) + DRQ(v) + DR (5)
Note equations 4 and 5 can be solved via DtD for DRm(a) for a ≥ 0, DRQ(v)
for any v, and DRg(t) for t > 0.
The goal is to extrapolate the exogenous curve DRg(t) backward for t < 0,
and this can be done by choosing the exogeneous curve that gives the result
that best approximates the total number of n month delinquent accounts over
the period t < 0 where this is available at portfolio level but not vintage level.
To do this deﬁne
AA0(v,t) = AAR0(t) ∗ BA(v) (6)
DA0(v,t) = DR0(v,t) ∗ AA0(v,t) (7)
where DRg(t) for t < 0 is the only unknown function. Choose this function so
that if
DA0(t) =
X
v
DA0(v,t), (8)
then the square of diﬀerence between the estimated and observed n month
delinquent accounts at each time t,
ηt = DA0(t) − DA(t), (9)
is minimized.
Since DRg(t) is non-parametric, a simple Quasi-Newton, one-dimensional
solver seeded from DRg(t + 1) is used to estimate the value of DRg(t) that
minimizes η2
t. The oldest part of the exogenous curve has large uncertainty due
to the diminishing number of vintages. In some cases, only annual vintages are
available for that oldest section, exacerbating the error. We truncate the series
when the error gets unacceptably large, but the augmentation for the series
analyzed below added several years of information, allowing the seasonality and
macroeconomic eﬀects to be better distinguished.5
2 Retail Credit Impacts
Experience with modeling retail portfolios in various countries has led to one
key suggestion. Select variables with clear, intuitive relationships to retail lend-
ing. To make stable stress testing models, one needs to focus on what drives
consumers rather than what drives the economy. Our goal is to create a model
of what drives consumer behavior and rely on economists to create scenarios for
those inputs from broader economic models.
Figure 2 encapsulates this consumer-centric world view. By looking for
macroeconomic variables that track the inﬂows (solid lines) and outﬂows (dashed
lines) of consumer wealth we hope to model the changes in consumer delinquency
and default rates. The diagram considers four major categories: employment,
assets, loans, and consumption.
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Figure 2: A simple model of the forces impacting consumer delinquency from a
macroeconomic perspective.
Employment is the most obvious and generally provides the strongest macroe-
conomic indicators of consumer delinquency. Metrics like employment, unem-
ployment, and sub-employment rates are usually available for economies around
the world and have provided consistent correlations to delinquency and default
rates across many types of economies. Measures of wage growth can also pro-
vide good indicators of consumer credit performance, but are generally more
diﬃcult to obtain.
Spending is somewhat less direct than employment. Core inﬂation rates can
provide a measure of the stresses on consumer balance sheets and therefore can
provide a leading indicator to consumer problems. Declines in consumption6
can also be a leading indicator of future problems, but often the lead time is
too long. Although oﬀering a long lead time seems like an advantage, many
things can happen in the economy along the way, so such variables can generate
unstable relationships from one cycle to the next.
Changes in asset values can have signiﬁcant impacts on consumers, but are
less frequent. Stock market bubbles can create a wealth eﬀect that drives down
defaults for those investing in the market. The bursting of such bubbles typi-
cally has an equally dramatic negative impact. Mortgage bubbles create similar
stresses. Although these eﬀects are signiﬁcant, most countries will have only
one just event within their data. Such bubbles are infrequent, so a recent mort-
gage bubble might provide excellent correlations, but the next such bubble is
unlikely to occur for many years. The best opportunity to beneﬁt from asset
bubble modeling is to borrow experiences from similar economies and approxi-
mate what could happen in economies that have not yet experienced them.
The other asset value eﬀect to consider is the deterioration of collateral value
in support of a loan, such as mortgages and auto loans. Although not a dominant
eﬀect, anecdotal evidence shows that when a consumer takes out a loan on a
house or auto and later the value of that asset plunges, the consumer may elect
to “send in the keys” rather than continue to make payments. One classic
example is with wrecked cars. When a vehicle is totaled, the consumer can
be indignant upon being informed that they are still liable for the outstanding
balance of the loan.
These are not ﬁnancially rational decisions, because of the damage done to
the consumer’s credit record, their diminished access to future loans, and the
interest rates assessed on other outstanding loans and lines-of-credit. Still, many
of the aspects we are modeling in this paper are behavioral rather than ﬁnancial
in origin.
The fourth consumer driver is outstanding consumer debt. When interest
rates fall, consumers can often reﬁnance their debt, creating more cash ﬂow.
Rises in interest rates can be equally damaging as adjustable rate products
require higher servicing payments. Debt burden is a commonly considered met-
ric. Generally speaking, debt burden has been rising for consumers globally
for decades. Gradual increases seem to reﬂect changes in lifestyle and attitude
toward credit. Certainly, higher debt burdens make consumers more sensitive
to economic shocks, but gradual rises in themselves do not appear to be the
root cause of delinquency shocks. However, sudden rises in debt burden, such
as those due to interest rate shocks, can deﬁnitely trigger consumer delinquency
events.
How consumers manage their debt is also strongly dependent on the laws
in place. Changes in bankruptcy laws, minimum payment rules, and interest
rate caps all have strong impacts on consumer behavior. Although not strictly
macroeconomic, these eﬀects can be dramatic. Unfortunately, regulatory events
tend to be one-time shocks that can be modeled retrospectively, but can only
be anticipated approximately by studying other economies where such events
occurred.
Death, divorce, and serious medical problems are not included in this di-7
agram. All of these impacts are known to be important drivers of individual
consumers defaulting on their credit, but they are problematic when used for
stress testing. At least in the US, divorce and medical records are not allowed
when building account-level models. Technically, they can be used for mak-
ing portfolio-level, strategic decisions, but portfolio managers refuse to consider
such variables, because of the reputation risk given the likely misunderstanding
by the public regarding how they are used. Also, macroeconomic variables often
correlate to these eﬀects. For example, ﬁnancial stress is the leading cause of di-
vorce in the US [4]. Similarly, medical problems do not cause loan delinquency,
however the corresponding costs of those medical problems drive delinquency,
and macroeconomic variables will usually capture issues such as spiraling med-
ical costs. A war or epidemic could, of course, cause the direct death of loan
holders, but those situations quickly lead to systemic failures of the ﬁnancial
systems in a country. To some extent, those events are also captured in macroe-
conomic factors, if such metrics are still being recorded under such extreme
circumstances. In stress testing, we are not trying to capture every factor that
may cause a consumer to go delinquent. Rather, we are trying to identify factors
that may correlate well to changes in the baseline level of delinquency and are
consistently available across economies.
In the following sections, we will provide examples for many of these rela-
tionships by looking at historical data for diﬀerent economies.
3 Thailand 1997 Asian Economic Crisis
The Asian Economic Crisis in 1997 provides a powerful case study. Researchers
have oﬀered a range of opinions on the root causes of the crisis [8, 5, 11]. Overall,
it seems clear that investors were becoming concerned about pressures build-
ing within the economy, which precipitated outﬂows of investment funds from
several economies.
From the perspective of Thai ﬁnancial centers, the crisis began in early
1997 with a run on the Thai currency. The shock in current account deﬁcit
precipitated ﬁrst an interest rate change and then ﬂoating the Baht against
other currencies. Within the country, and particularly Bangkok, the end of
the foreign investment inﬂux caused a crash in the overbuilt commercial real
estate market and led to the government’s closure of 56 distressed ﬁnancial
institutions in December of 1997. As construction and other industries suﬀered
from a liquidity crunch, consumers lost their jobs. The inevitable result was a
rise in unemployment and a rise in loan delinquencies.
From a consumer perspective, the onset of the crisis can be seen earlier.
At the beginning of 1996 the changes began. House price appreciation slowed
dramatically. At the same time, retail sales started to slide and unemployment
began to tick up. This was not a recession, but the early indication that the
economy had begun to overheat. Over the next year this appeared to create the
imbalances that led to the run on the Baht and economic crash.
From this period, the authors were allowed access to vintage-level data from8
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Figure 3: Comparison of Thai macroeconomic data during the 1997 Asian Eco-
nomic Crisis. YoY% refers to a computing the ratio of a given month to the same
month in the previous year and expressing the result as a percentage change.9
some retail loan portfolios in Thailand. The vintages were originated from 1990
through September 1998. The vintage performance data covers a period from
February 1995 through September 1998. This data was processed with DtD to
extract maturation, exogenous, and vintage quality curves. Because of privacy
concerns, only the exogenous curves capturing the environmental impacts are
shown here.
In addition, the authors also had access for some portfolios to aggregate
data going back as far as April 1990. The aggregate data was analyzed with
the backward extrapolation method described earlier to estimate what the ex-
ogenous curve would have been in order for the total portfolio to behave as
observed.
This analysis was applied to data for prime and subprime credit card port-
folios in Thailand. These portfolios had experienced strong recent growth and
signiﬁcant changes in originations policies. The DtD decomposition isolated
and removed those eﬀects. With the completion of this process, we have the
exogenous curves for delinquency and balance dynamics extracted for vintage
data from early 2005 through mid 2008. Using the aggregate information, we
extrapolated the delinquency exogenous curves back through 1992, though with
higher noise for the oldest parts.
Studying ﬁrst the Subprime Card, bucket one delinquency was rising steadily
but gradually for several years preceding the 1997 shock. This period could be
explained by growth in credit lines during this period or a number of other
policy changes. The next two delinquency buckets improved in 1995 relative
to 1994, but began to deteriorate in 1996. The dramatic rise in early 1997
coincides with the economic collapse. However, some of that early 1997 rise
appears to be the usual seasonal delinquency when compared to previous years.
The apparent recovery in the ﬁrst two delinquency buckets in mid 1997 is thus
likely just transitory. Real improvement in early delinquency does not begin
until 1998. Looking to the late delinquency stages, we see that improvements
never come within the available data.
Overall we see that a large burst of delinquency occurred immediately. One
year after the onset of the crisis, accounts may not be going to one-month-
delinquent any more frequently than before the crisis, but those accounts will
go seriously delinquent at a much higher rate than previous years. When con-
sidering Basel II stress testing, the Flow through 90-119 DPD is a good proxy
for the probability of default (PD) rates.
The exogenous curves for the balance dynamics were limited to just the
results from the vintage analysis. Balance per current account was relatively ﬂat,
with seasonal variations, to the beginning of 1997. At that point, management
likely began to rapidly curtail the available credit lines.
The Ratio of Contractual Charge-oﬀ Balance to Current Account Balance
showed a dramatic spike at the beginning of 1997 as the crisis began. This is the
usual pattern where the high balance, high risk accounts are most vulnerable
to macroeconomic shocks and preferentially roll to charge-oﬀ. After those ac-
counts, the next wave would have been large numbers of the lowest credit quality
accounts that would have been assigned lower balances. These would have been10
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Figure 4: Delinquency and Balance Dynamics for Thai Prime and Subprime
Card portfolios. Relative Environmental Impact refers to how much more or less
of the given metric was experienced in a given month as due to environmental
changes. The axis scale is the log of the multiplicative impact with the zero line
representing the overall average level observed for the data set. To convert the
axis to a percentage, one would compute ey − 1.11
low income consumers who were generally responsible with their credit use, but
were nonetheless driven into delinquency by the crisis. In the last phase, better
quality accounts would be left, but as the crisis persisted, those would even-
tually go delinquent as well. Other explanations are of course possible for the
movements in this curve. This explanation is based upon personal experiences
with this and similar crises, but is essentially an hypothesis.
The combination of Balance per Current Account and the Ratio of Balance
per Contractual Charge-oﬀ Account to Current Account Balance provide some
insight on how Exposure at Default (EAD) would have behaved.
Lastly we have the Balance Recovery Rate. Again, this was relatively stable
prior to the crisis, but plunged steadily through the recession. This is the bad
news for estimates of Loss Given Default (LGD), because it shows that when
PD was high, EAD was still severe, and LGD was severely worsening to the
point of almost no recoveries.
For the prime credit card portfolio, the bucket data was unreliable, but the
subsequent buckets all showed improvement or stability up to the onset of the
shock in 1997. Unlike the subprime portfolio, however, there was no initial burst
of delinquency. Prime accounts would have had more assets and presumably
more reliable employment. As a result, prime delinquency rose more slowly.
The bad news is that no recovery was seen through to the end of the data. At
that point, the recession was severe and everyone was aﬀected.
The balance dynamics are interesting in comparison to subprime. Current
balances actually rose some at the onset of the crisis, probably because manage-
ment was reluctant to cut credit lines for these consumers initially. Charge-oﬀ
balance ratios fell initially, as the poorer of the prime accounts probably had
lower lines and rolled through to charge-oﬀ preferentially at the beginning of
the crisis. Into 1998, charge-oﬀ balances rose dramatically just as was seen in
subprime, as the better accounts in the portfolio with higher lines were also
pushed into default. Also as with subprime, recovery rates plunged throughout
the crisis. However, noting the scale, the recovery rates did not fall as dramat-
ically as with subprime, presumably because the prime consumers had more
underlying assets.
3.1 Thai Econometric Modeling
The preceding analysis is in preparation for making an econometric model of
the exogenous curve. Multi-factor models were tried, but generally produced
lower F-test values than the single-factor models. Clearly, any of these primary
macroeconomic variables can explain the rise in consumer delinquency. Without
more training data, the best approach would appear to be to create a set of
independent, single-factor models and then use a voting methodology to reduce
noise and increase robustness out of sample.
The following table has the factors that correlated well to the exogenous
curve for Account Flow through 90-119 DPD Rate. That rate was selected as a
close approximation to the Basel II deﬁnition of default. A positive lag means
that the macroeconomic factor is a leading indicator of portfolio performance.12
Negative lags indicate lagging indicators, which is common for unemployment
rates. The lags shown represent the maximum correlation between the exoge-
nous curve and the macroeconomic variable being considered. A simple scan
from large positive to large negative lags was performed to ﬁnd the best corre-
lation.
ρ σρ Intercept B σB t-Test
Log Baht/$ Exchange Rate 0.51 0.09 -5.64 3.84 0.66 5.84
Interbank Interest Rate: Call (Lag 5) 0.63 0.09 -0.58 6.95 1.00 6.94
Log Interbank Interest Rate: Call (Lag 5) 0.55 0.09 1.49 0.63 0.10 6.43
Yield Curve Slope (Lag 6) 0.68 0.08 -1.58 0.23 0.03 8.86
CPI, YoY% (Lag 1) 0.67 0.08 -1.10 15.90 1.80 8.83
Real M1, YoY% (Lag 5) -0.75 0.07 0.17 -5.67 0.53 -10.79
Real GDP, YoY% (Lag 11) -0.63 0.09 -0.39 -1.57 0.23 -6.92
Mfg Production Index, YoY% (Lag 4) -0.67 0.08 0.12 -4.50 0.54 -8.38
Imports - Consumer Goods as % GDP (Lag 3) -0.40 0.10 1.42 -43.55 10.87 -4.01
Unemployment Rate SA (Lag -7) 0.52 0.09 -0.78 21.92 3.65 6.00
Unemployment Rate, YoY% (Lag -3) 0.63 0.09 -0.19 0.51 0.07 6.95
Single-Detached House Price, YoY% (Lag 5) 0.63 0.09 -0.30 5.23 0.76 6.91
Table 1: Factors correlated to Flow through 90-119 DPD Rate for Thai Sub-
prime Card.
The factors shown in Table 1 were chosen to illustrate a few points. Fac-
tors like exchange rates, money supply, manufacturing production index, and
imports are typically very diﬃcult to obtain scenarios. Some factors, like ex-
change rates, are closely tied to the details of this crisis and would not be
expected to generalize well to future crises. For this reason, we focus on interest
rates, GDP, unemployment, and house prices.
Another common question is how best to transform these variables. Interest
rates are shown directly and with a log transform. In this case, the log trans-
form lessens the correlation, but not greatly compared to the uncertainties. As
a rule, a log transform may make the model more stable to simulating extreme
events, as is demonstrated for the Indonesian analysis below. Unemployment
rate is shown both as the seasonally adjusted rate and a Year-over-Year per-
centage change. Again, it is diﬃcult to conclude which is better in general.
Some practitioners make the case that change in employment is better than the
unemployment rate, but that metric was not available for comparison.
Insuﬃcient data was available to conduct an out-of-sample test. However,
the Thai government began collecting statistics on non-performing loans (NPLs)
shortly after the crisis [16]. From this data, we extracted the New NPLs, Re-
entry NPLs (previously delinquent accounts that have returned to delinquency
after an initial loan rewrite), and NPL inventory. NPL is deﬁned at accounts
that are three or more months delinquenct.
The plot at left shows the three NPL measures. The plot at right compares
New plus Re-entry NPLs to the average forecast from the bottom three models
in Table 1. The House Price model was excluded because the post-crisis House
Price data was so noisy that it would clearly not produce a reasonable forecast.
Note that the forecast was made for a credit card portfolio where maturation13
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Figure 5: Non-performing loan rates provided by the Bank of Thailand.
and quality eﬀects were cleaned out. The non-performing loans will include
all products, and thus spread over time because of the varying default timing
among products. Nevertheless, the model has a correlation to the NPL data of
ρ = 0.42. If we consider that the credit card model could be a leading indicator
of other products and allow for a lag, we see that at lag 2, ρ = 0.53 and with
lag 6, ρ = 0.80.
4 Indonesia 1996 Stress
When the crisis began in Thailand, Indonesia seemed to be in a relatively strong
ﬁnancial position. Nevertheless, contagion eﬀects caused a similar run on the
Indonesian Rupiah. The ﬁnal result was that Indonesia was hit hardest by the
Asian Economic Crisis of 1997-1998. Adding to the instability was the ouster of
the old regime in 1998. Although replaced with a more democratic government,
Indonesia was hard-hit by the shock. [15]
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Figure 6: Data for the Indonesian economic environment.
For Indonesia, we analyzed vintage-level data from a prime credit card port-
folio and extracted the exogenous curve from 1995 through 1998. We also had14
access to previous portfolio-level performance data which we used to extend
the history of macroeconomic impacts on the portfolio back to 1993 for the
delinquency measures. Unfortunately, the available data ends just as the 1998
recession was beginning to be felt by consumers. However, we do capture some
interesting dynamics just prior to the recession. From a consumer delinquency
perspective, early 1994 market a turning point from improving in 1993 to wors-
ening through 1996. By early 1997 consumer delinquency had begun to improve
again, just before the Asian Economic Crisis hit. This pattern is also hinted at
in data shown in Goeltom (2006) [6].
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Figure 7: Exogenous curves from the analysis of vintage performance data for
an Indonesian credit card portfolio.
Although the 1997-1998 shock dominates the plots of the macroeconomic
data, the trends from 1994 through 1996 were clearly signiﬁcant. Unemploy-
ment and interest rates both doubled through this period. There was no re-
cession in this period in terms of GDP, but GDP began to slow in 1996 before
accelerating in 1997, when it ﬁnally lifted consumers. Thus, the economy ex-
panded overall from 1993 through 1997, but the growth was not broad based
and coincided with a worsening environment for consumers. This was possible
because the economic expansion was fueled by exports more than domestic con-
sumer expenditures. This is an example where GDP growth is not a suﬃcient
metric for the health of the consumer balance sheet, and it highlights the fact
that suﬃcient structure can exist for retail stress testing even in environments
that do not show recessions.
Interestingly, the dynamics of consumer balances of 1995 through 1997 mir-
ror those in Thailand in 1997 to 1998 as the economic crisis developed there.15
In 1995, the Balance per Current Account peaks as the consumer deterioration
persists. Charge-oﬀ balances peak at this time as well, as the highest balance
consumers default ﬁrst. Recoveries peak early along with the high balance ac-
counts, but then fall until the consumer recovery begins in 1997. None of the
charge-oﬀs or recoveries from the Asian Economic Crisis appear in the time pe-
riod considered, so one is left to assume that this pattern will begin to repeat
in 1998.
Using the Flow through 90-119 DPD Rate again as a reasonable proxy for the
default rate, we considered correlations between that exogenous curve and the
available macroeconomic variables. As is already apparent, economic stresses
existed which come through in interest rates, unemployment, and consumer
spending. However, GDP exhibited no signiﬁcant relationship to delinquency
and thus was left out. Unlike in the US consumer-driven economy, a disconnect
between GDP and consumer health is common in developing countries where
consumers may not drive economic growth. As before, multi-factor models were
not statistically viable given the limited data.
ρ σρ Intercept B σB t-Test
Log Interbank Call Rate (Lag 11) 0.72 0.09 1.4 1.63 0.21 7.87
Unemployment Rate (Lag 6) 0.35 0.12 -0.52 9.52 3.32 2.87
Real Consumer Spending, YoY % (Lag 4) -0.54 0.11 0.072 -1.78 0.36 -4.90
Table 2: Factors correlated to Flow through 90-119 DPD Rate for Indonesian
Subprime Card.
We have no data with which to conduct an out of sample validation. Al-
though we get some reasonable correlations, the data quality is such that these
may not be good enough forecast models. In particular, annual data is insuf-
ﬁcient to measure the lag of portfolio impacts – the exception being that the
interest rate data is available monthly up to the present time. Using just that
variable to forecast, we obtain the result in Figure 8. From this, we can see
that a model built on the non-recession event in 1996 does provide a plausible
extrapolation for the 1998 crisis.
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Figure 8: In-sample ﬁt an forecast of Indonesian Card late delinquency using
the log of the interest rate with lag of 11 months.
The most encouraging aspect is that the variables, lags, and correlations all16
make sense relative to the other results shown here.
5 Hong Kong 2003 SARS Recession
Hong Kong is unique among countries for which we have reliable macroeconomic
data and mature retail loan portfolios. The data in ﬁgure 9(a) clearly shows
the impacts of the Asian Economic Crisis in 1998 and the global recession of
2001.[17] However, data from 2003 shows a short recession caused by SARS,
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome.[12] This is the only example we have of a
recession caused by contagious disease. Although only 1,755 people became ill
and 299 died out of a population of 6.8 million, the economy of Hong Kong took
a measurable hit. Besides the short, sharp drop in GDP, we also see a ”second
hump” in unemployment in 2003 just when employment had started to recover
following the 2001 recession.
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Figure 9: Hong Kong macroeconomic factors related to retail lending. The
Asian Economic Crisis (1998), the global economic crisis of 2001, and the SARS
recession (2002) are all visible in the data and had clear impacts on retail port-
folios in the area.
The signiﬁcance of this event is that we can see how sensitive the economy
was to the fear of an epidemic, in part through the economically dampening
eﬀects of the disease prevention measures. Since the outbreak of SARS and
later Avian Flu, contagious disease is being considered more often as a poten-
tial stress test scenario. Nowhere else do we have data for the impact of disease
on retail loan portfolios, but from the Hong Kong experience we see that stress
test models are still possible. By correlating retail loan performance to unem-
ployment and housing prices, we can again prepare models for the possibility of
future disease outbreaks.
This has the eﬀect of transferring the modeling challenge to economists and17
epidemiologists to predict the impact of a pandemic on the economy – not an
easy task. Still, that is a more appropriate process than expecting a credit
risk analyst to assess the impact of global pandemic directly on a bank’s loan
portfolio.
HKR t i l L
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.5
1.0
1.5
n
t
a
l
 
I
m
p
a
c
t
Hong Kong Retail Loans
04
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
-0.5
-0.4
-1.5
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
R
e
PD EAD (Right)
(a) PD and EAD
Hong Kong Retail Loans
0.5
1.0
1.5
n
t
a
l
 
I
m
p
a
c
t
Hong Kong Retail Loans
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
-1.5
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
R
e
LGD Modified LGD
(b) LGD
Figure 10: Exogenous curves from DtD analysis of vintage performance data
for a Hong Kong retail loan portfolio.
We analyzed vintage performance data from September 2001 through June
2007 for a Hong Kong retail loan portfolio, extracting exogenous curves for PD,
EAD, and LGD as shown in Figure 10(b). PD shows a peak in 2002 from the
2001 global recession and again in 2003 from the SARS epidemic.
For comparison, Kang and Ma (2007)[7] show impaired card asset rates.
Their data is only card, whereas the portfolio dataset analyzed here is a blend
of products retail products including card, mortgage, and personal loans. More
importantly, the industry wide data impairment rate is the ratio of current
impaired loans to the total outstanding loan balance. Such ratios suﬀer from
the problems of growing loan volumes, lags between origination and default,
and changes in origination policy. These diﬃculties are the reason their data
will look diﬀerent from the exogenous curve in Figure 10(a) and also provide
an example of how the DtD approach adds value in clarifying macroeconomic
impacts on portfolio performance.
The following tables show variables that correlate well to PD and EAD. The
PD correlations are in line with what we have observed previously and easily
capture both recessions within the training data. Hong Kong is one of the few
economies where good house price data is available, so we were also able to show
that correlation. Tse (1996) [13] provides a detailed analysis of the Hong Kong
housing market and house price dynamics.
The correlations for EAD are probably less reliable than PD, because there
is less structure in this data. The rise in EAD after the recessions correlates
to housing prices, which makes sense intuitively, but must be viewed as having
limited statistical signiﬁcance given that we have not seen a full cycle for this
variable. Capturing a future fall in house prices would be very valuable for
conﬁrmation.18
ρ σρ Intercept B σB t-Test
Real GDP, YoY % (Lag 9) -0.58 0.10 0.74 -12.38 2.03 -6.10
CPI, YoY % (Lag 3) -0.76 0.07 -0.21 -27.39 2.58 -10.64
Grade C Hong Kong Residential Price Index (Lag 1) -0.83 0.06 3.22 -0.0589 0.0043 -13.71
Unemployment Rate, SA, (Lag -2) 0.83 0.06 -2.89 49.79 3.50 14.24
Table 3: Factors correlated to the default rate for a Hong Kong retail portfolio,
all products.
ρ σρ Intercept B σB t-Test
Real GDP, YoY % 0.53 0.11 -0.16 2.63 0.53 5.00
Grade C Hong Kong Residential Price Index (Lag -13) 0.67 0.11 -0.52 0.0085 0.0014 6.04
Table 4: Factors correlated to exposure at default for a Hong Kong retail port-
folio, all products.
Loss Given Default (LGD) shows an unexpected and dramatic drop in June
2003 in Figure 10(b). Changes driven by macroeconomic changes do not usually
have this appearance, as is evident from the other portfolios analyzed here. As
is often the case, no explanation was available from those providing the data,
so we have no way of determining a priori whether this event is from business
policy changes or macroeconomic impacts.
Given the likelihood that the June 2003 event is artiﬁcial, we modeled LGD
directly with macroeconomic data and again after modifying the curve to remove
the shock. Both sets of correlations are shown below. We can explain the
LGD directly with macroeconomic data, but we ﬁnd better macroeconomic
correlations for the modiﬁed curve.
ρ σρ Intercept B σB t-Test
Real Wages (Lag 8) 0.66 0.09 -0.023 18.55 2.56 7.24
Real GDP, YoY % (Lag 2) -0.41 0.11 0.41 -6.66 1.82 -3.66
Grade C Hong Kong Residential Price Index (Lag 2) -0.14 0.12 0.44 -0.0067 0.0059 -1.14
CPI, YoY % -0.21 0.12 0.04 -5.78 3.29 -1.75
Table 5: Factors correlated to loss given default for a Hong Kong retail portfolio,
all products.
This example highlights one of the greatest values of the DtD approach.
Armed with these results, we can review with management and motivate further
investigation of the shock in June 2003. This avoids simply explaining such
events with macroeconomic data when deeper explanations may exist.
6 Singapore 2001 Recession
Singapore was lightly hit by the Asian Economic Crisis, relatively speaking.
From the perspective of GDP growth and Unemployment, the 2001 global re-
cession was much more severe [9]. Nevertheless, the Asian Economic Crisis
would appear to provide ample data for creating a stress test model.
Our available retail loan data for Singapore was quite short, too short to19
ρ σρ Intercept B σB t-Test
Real Wages (Lag 8) -0.52 0.10 -0.37 -12.01 2.41 -4.98
Real GDP, YoY % (Lag 2) 0.63 0.09 -0.87 8.52 1.27 6.70
Grade C Hong Kong Residential Price Index (Lag 2) 0.86 0.06 -2.26 0.0334 0.0024 13.69
CPI, YoY % 0.82 0.07 -0.34 18.58 1.61 11.57
Table 6: Factors correlated to loss given default, adjusted for a possible man-
agement action, for a Hong Kong retail portfolio, all products.
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Figure 11: Data on the Singaporean economic environment.
clearly distinguish seasonality.
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Figure 12: Exogenous curves from the analysis of available Singaporean vintage
data leading up to the Asian Economic Crisis.
Fortunately, there is data available on personal bankruptcies in Singapore
starting in 2001. This does not allow us to analyze the Asian Economic Crisis
of 1997, but we can examine this in the context of the 2001 global recession.
The Singaporean bankruptcy data, and the examples that follow, are not
vintage level performance data. As such, we cannot apply DtD and instead use
normal time series methods. The disadvantage is clear when the Argentine slow
debt is considered later.
Correlating bankruptcy to the usual macroeconomic variables, we found rea-
sonable correlations to the variablesin Table 7. In this case, the lags are all
negative, indicating that personal bankruptcy is a leading indicator of the ma-20
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Figure 13: Singaporean bankruptcy rate data from the Singapore Ministry of
Law.
jor macroeconomic indices. This is not too surprising, since bankruptcy is an
accelerated path to default that can occur quicker than the contractual path to
default. As we found before, multi-factor models are not statistically signiﬁcant
given the available data.
ρ σρ Intercept B σB t-Test
PPI / WPI, Y-o-Y % (Lag -3) -0.78 0.082 0.51 -7.61 0.80 -9.53
Real GDP, YoY % (Lag -3) -0.64 0.10 0.52 -8.04 1.29 -6.22
Unemployment Rate (Lag -8) 0.53 0.11 -1.45 51.65 10.82 4.77
Table 7: Factors correlated to the Singaporean bankruptcy rate.
6.1 Canada 2001 Non-Recession
Canada is often described as a challenging environment for stress testing, be-
cause no oﬃcial recessions have occured since 1990. Canada and Australia
slowed but did not fall into recession during the 2001-2003 period in which the
US and Europe fell into recession. However, the lack of a recession does not
mean that there is no structure available for modeling.
Since aggregate bankruptcy data is available in Canada [10], we consider that
as a proxy for overall consumer delinquency. Bankruptcy rates have shown long
term increases, which others have studied. [1] For stress testing, we are most
interested in the shorter-term oscillations that would seem visually to correlate
to changes in the economy. In ﬁgure 14(a) we compare year-over-year changes in
bankruptcies to several macroeconomic variables. The bankruptcy rate shown
here is the number of bankruptcy ﬁlings approved in a given month. It is not an
inventory measure, but it can be signiﬁcantly lagged relative to economic shocks
that might have caused the initial ﬁling. Because no vintage level performance
data is available, only simple time series methods were used.
Figure 14(b) shows a comparison of bankruptcy versus the unemployment
rate. Although changes in bankruptcy exhibit a good correlation to unemploy-
ment of ρ = 0.43, there is also an obvious outlier period. In 1997 the Canadian
bankruptcy laws were revised to encourage consumers to use other means of21
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Figure 14: Comparisons of consumer bankruptcy rates to Canadian macroeco-
nomic data.
debt resolution and to defer bankruptcy ﬁlings for student loans. The eﬀect was
a signiﬁcantly depressed period of bankruptcy starting in October 1997 and re-
laxing back to normal levels over the next 18 months. If we exclude the data
from October 1997 through October 1998, the correlation rises to ρ = 0.69.
ρ σρ Intercept B σB t-Test
Unemployment Rate SA % (Lag 8) 0.43 0.079 -0.34 0.048 0.0087 5.49
Table 8: Modeling Bankruptcy Filings, YoY %
ρ σρ Intercept B σB t-Test
Unemployment Rate SA % (Lag 8) 0.70 0.069 -0.46 0.068 0.0067 10.08
Table 9: Modeling Bankruptcy Filings, YoY %, trimmed for the 1997
bankruptcy law change.
7 Argentina 1995 Tequila Eﬀect
In April 1991, the Argentine government created a ﬁxed relationship between
the Argentine Peso and the US dollar in an attempt to stem inﬂation. The result
was almost four years of strong economic growth. However, this period ended
abruptly as the Mexican Peso Crisis spilled over into other Latin American
economies in what has been termed the Tequila Eﬀect. [14] A ﬁnancial system
crisis occurred in March 1995 with problems in the economy and consumer
delinquency shortly thereafter.
Although we could not obtain vintage-level data from this period to an-
alyze, the Argentine Central Bank maintained several measures of consumer
delinquency. Figure 15(a) contains a summary statistic called “Consumer Slow
Debt”. Slow debt is actually a measure of the inventory of delinquent accounts,22
rather than new delinquencies. As such, the peak correlations to macroeconomic
factors will be lagged and longer lasting than one would otherwise expect. For
the current analysis, we consider the period from January 1993 through the end
of the available data, September 1997, so that we may focus on just the Tequila
Eﬀect and avoid inventory spill-over from previous events.
One unique aspect of the Argentine consumer lending environment was the
ability of consumers to choose whether to maintain loans and savings accounts
in either US Dollars to Argentine Pesos. That meant that as the crisis began,
consumers rapidly switched their funds to dollars and would prefer to let Peso-
denominated accounts go delinquent rather than move dollars to pesos to make
the payments. This results in rapid consumer delinquency at the onset of a
crisis, but a long delinquency period as consumers wait to pay-oﬀ their debt.
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Figure 15: Comparisons of consumer-oriented macroeconomic variables to con-
sumer slow debt in Argentina during the Tequila Eﬀect, which followed from
the Mexican Peso Crisis.
Also beneﬁcial to a stress testing discussion is that the Argentine government
published a range of macroeconomic variables related to consumer ﬁnancial
health.
The crisis was initiated by a ﬂight of capital out of the country, with the
corresponding exchange rate and interest rate shocks. A rise in unemploy-
ment followed immediately after the economic shock. We considered a range of
macroeconomic factors and found several strong correlations among plausibly
connected variables. Of course, a model to a single economic cycle will gener-
ally exhibit high correlations and low uncertainties relative to what one should
expect when multiple economic cycles are available. Any multi-factor model we
considered resulted in a lower F-statistic, so a single factor is all this single eco-
nomic cycle could support, short of performing a principal components analysis
in order to combine multiple variables.
All of the variables modeled here had long lead times relative to the slow
debt measure. Much of this can be attributed to the fact that slow debt is an
inventory measure. Correlating to new slow debt would undoubtedly result in
shorter lead times.23
ρ σρ Intercept B σB t-Test
Ratio Local to Foreign Currency Deposits (Lag 12) 0.67 0.11 0.23 0.16 0.027 5.97
Log 30 Day Interest Rate (Lag 10) 0.68 0.10 0.49 0.25 0.037 6.73
CPI, YoY % (Lag 10) 0.55 0.12 0.44 0.46 0.098 4.71
Unemployed, YoY % (Lag 6) 0.55 0.12 0.44 0.12 0.025 4.75
Labor Demand Index, BA, YoY % (Lag 1) -0.59 0.15 0.46 -0.10 0.025 -4.06
Table 10: Factors correlated to Argentine Slow Debt with slope and intercept
calibrations. ρ is the correlation between the factor and Argentine Slow Debt.
σρ is the uncertainty in the correlation. B and σB are the scaling coeﬃcient and
uncertainty in that whem making a one-factor regression model.
8 Conclusions
Comparing models across multiple recessions allows us to look for consistency
in the models created. We found that the same sets of variables provided cor-
relations across diﬀerent economies and diﬀerent types of events. Even though
very diﬀerent events are represented here, similar factors appear throughout.
Table 8 arranges the variables according to how much they lead the consumer
performance metric. Industry wide time series can be used to ﬁnd correlations,
but problems due to changes in industry originations are present. The DtD
Exogenous curves allowed us to normalize individual client data such that the
macroeconomic correlations become apparent.
From the table, we can see that GDP and interest rates consistently lead
unemployment, and that all appear repeatedly as providing good correlations.
House prices appear whenever the data is available, again as a consistently
leading indicator. Bankruptcy rates respond so quickly to the economy, that
the macroeconomic factors are generally shifted to lagging indicators. However,
even strongly correlated lagging indicators can be useful for stress testing.
In this analysis, we were unable to state with certainty what would be the
correct transformation of employment / unemployment. The performance met-
rics being predicted were too varied and the data too short to draw ﬁrm con-
clusions. Looking at interest rates, it seems to be the case that log transforms
provide more stability when trying to extrapolate to extreme events, but again
the test cases were too short for certainty.
We see that structure in the macroeconomic data must be sought from the
consumer perspective. Sometimes no recession will be apparent when consumers
have actually experienced a signiﬁcant event. This was observed clearly in
Indonesia. In Canada where no oﬃcial recessions had occurred in recent years,
suﬃcient structure still existed for the creation of a model.
The exogenous curves derived from vintage data did correlate well to macroe-
conomic factors, and have proven to be a useful practical way of bringing man-
agement intuition into the modeling process. The back-casting approach used
to bring portfolio level data into the exogenous curve estimation was extremely
helpful in augmenting some of the short data sets in order to better understand
the seasonality and long term macroeconomic impacts. Point-in-time measures
such as monthly delinquency and default rates always correlate better to macroe-24
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conomic factors than inventory measures like slow debt or cumulative defaults
in a year.
The greatest challenge to any stress test modeling is data length. Only one
of these examples included two recessions. As such, it is impossible to make
statistically rigorous and validated models. The best we can do for now is to
seek consistency across economies as cross-validation of the model components.
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